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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
This study explores the forces that have impact on manufacturers' choice of types of transactions 
with distributors. Our objective was to show that some other factors in addition to TCE variables 
can affect transaction costs and influence a company's choice of whether or not to integrate. More 
specifically, we tried to examine the role that trust plays in the contexts of manufacturers' choice of 
transaction governance mode and manufacturer-distributor relationships.  
The results of empirical study suggest that manufacturers' choice of engaging distributors was de-
termined by the following set of factors: asset specificity (the degree to which an asset is custom-
ized to the user's needs or the degree to which it can be redeployed to alternative uses), uncertainty 
(the level availability of information necessary for making key decisions and predicting conse-
quences thereof) and trust. Trust in this study was treated as a product of certain informal and for-
mal institutions, e.g. kinship norms and legal environment. We distinguished between network trust 
(trust arising from friendship or family relations, recommendation and information received from 
former or current colleagues, business associations and government agencies) and extended trust (a 
product of sound functioning of formal institutions that establish business environment subject to 
the rule of law). During the study we found that the network trust, in turn, could be subdivided into 
inner networks (networks comprised of only friends and relatives) and outer networks (networks, 
which incorporate independent distributors recommended by business associations and government 
agencies). 
We found that the rise in the levels of asset specificity and uncertainty increase the probability of 
in-house performance of distribution function by manufacturer. Both network trust variables in-
crease producer firms' willingness to employ external distributors. These findings extend TCE theo-
retical paradigm by demonstrating that network trust along with TCE variables influences manufac-
turers' choice of transaction governance mode. Not only does network trust help to explain a manu-
facturer's vertical integration choice, but also explains variation in intensity of relationships between 
manufacturers and distributors.  Higher level of trust existing between partners leads to less com-
plete contracts and lower prepayment requirements, reducing thus transaction cost and facilitating 
economic exchange.  
However, we failed to find any significant effect of such policy relevant factor as extended trust (of 
which main determinant is the reliability of legal institutions). None of the variables used in this study 
as proxies for extended trust had any significant effect on manufacturers' choice of governance mode 
or on the intensity of relationship between partners. We presume that this is mainly due to the fact that 
our study was limited to one country. Objectively, degree of rule of law and quality of legal institu-
tions that are determinants of extended trust could barely vary within the same country.  
The importance of the study findings could be better seen in the context of economic advantages of 
trust-based governance modes. Higher levels of in-house performance of distribution function by 
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manufacturers means fewer opportunities to gain benefits from specialization and cooperation. Fur-
thermore, increase in the complexity of contract arrangements between manufacturers and distribu-
tors in the form of required amount of prepayments and degree of completeness increases the costs 
of making transactions and lowers economic efficiency. All these factors could impede possibilities 
for a country's economic growth. A proper understanding of the role of trust could be important, 
especially to creating the adequate institutional environment in Georgia. Among the reasons that 
hampered the achievement of economic prosperity in Georgia, lack of formal as well as informal 
market institutions, which could lower transaction costs and promote specialization and cooperation 
between economic agents, does stand out. Even in developed countries saturated with reliable en-
forcement institutions, trust-based norms are often cheap and effective substitute for law and other 
formal arrangements. In the poor institutional environment of transition economies, where non-
payment and deterioration of property rights become widespread, developing of trust-based norms 
can give rise to efficient property rights favorable for specialization and collective actions thereby 
facilitating economic growth in the country.  
Thus the major policy recommendation of the study is the encouragement of trust between manu-
facturers and distributors through promotion of networks. However, one should realize that inner 
networks could potentially limit business relations between producers and distributors only to net-
works comprised of friends and relatives, while outer networks broaden such opportunities to a 
wider number of independent distributors recommended by business associations and government 
agencies. We found that outer networks substantially lower the probability of vertical integration as 
well as the amount of required prepayment and level of contract completeness, thus reducing trans-
action costs and enhancing efficiency of market mechanisms. Therefore, the government policy 
must be focused on the outer networks through promotion of business associations and widening of 
government agencies' involvement in supporting establishment of relations between producers and 
distributors.  This can reduce transaction cost, facilitate economic exchange and in the long run help 
economic growth. 
We presume that further research must employ cross-national study and should be focused on the 
understanding of mechanisms that generate extended trust and on the study of its contribution to 
lowering transaction costs and facilitating economic exchange between companies. This problem is 
very important, particularly in the context of development of transition economies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of recent research in the area of industrial organization was devoted to the study of 
different types of coordination of economic activity. The theoretical framework that underlies this 
stream of research offered by Coase (Coase, 1937) and further elaborated on by Williamson (Wil-
liamson, 1975; 1981; 1985; 1996) is known as transaction cost economics (TCE). According to this 
paradigm market transaction will be governed by the most efficient governance arrangement that 
minimizes transaction costs of coordinating economic activity. The transaction cost approach em-
phasizes two major types of transaction governance — markets and hierarchies — and identifies 
three dimensions of transactions — asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency — that determine 
which type of coordination is most efficient.  
The present research seeks to extend existing TCE theoretical paradigm by introducing a new vari-
able — trust — in studying a firm's choice of appropriate transaction governance mode. In particu-
lar we explore the effects of trust and TCE variables — asset specificity, uncertainty — on the pat-
terns of organizing of distribution function by manufacturers. The question is how producer deals 
with this issue: by integrating sales force, by forming cooperative arrangements with independent 
distributors, or by using market governance mode. Our focus on this topic is stipulated by the fact 
that coordinating of the vertical relationships represents one of the main motivations for cooperative 
agreements between manufacturers and distributors (Mariti, 1985) and thereby it could facilitate 
understanding of the role of trust in inter-firm relations.  
The study is confined to the realities of transition economies where these problems are of very im-
portance, taking into account unreliable functioning of contract enforcement institutions (Kornai, 
2003). Recent studies of trust as a product of informal and formal institution revealed its main de-
terminants (Johnson, 1997; McMillan, 1999; Raiser, 2004) and its importance in explaining varia-
tion of economic performance and business formation (Johnson, 1999) in transition economies. 
However, the effect of trust on the firm's choice of transaction governance mode up to the moment 
received very sparse attention from researchers. A survey of a sample of Georgian manufacturing 
firms was conducted to fill the gap in empirical study of this problem. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the existing literature in two fields 
of interest: transaction cost economics research and trust-related research. Based on the literature 
review, the research hypotheses are formulated in section 3. In section 4 we turn to a discussion of 
the research methodology, including description of sample, variable and estimation techniques. The 
fifth section provides analysis into the study results. The final remarks are presented in section 6. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Transaction Cost Economics Research  
A number of empirical studies have witnessed the validity of the key hypothesis of the transaction 
cost approach proposed by Coase and Williamson: markets fail and firms tend to integrate vertically 
when transaction is characterized by high levels of uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency of 
re-contracting (Anderson, 1984; Crocker, 1993; Joscow, 1987; Monteverde, 1982; Shepard, 1993).  
A review of the literature reveals a special empirical interest in the effect of the main TCE dimen-
sions on vertical integration, length and completeness of contracts and etc.  
Crocker and Reynolds (Crocker, 1993) using panel data on the pricing procedures used in US Air 
Force engine procurement contracts found that the degree of contractual incompleteness reflects the 
economic costs of drafting a more complete document and the losses associated with incomplete 
agreements. The empirical findings of the study suggest that past opportunistic behavior and poten-
tial for hold-up in sole-source environment results in the use of more complete contracts, while 
higher level of environmental complexity and remote dates for contract performance lead to the 
adoption of less exhaustive arrangements. 
Joscow (Joscow, 1987) examined the importance of relationship-specific investments in determin-
ing the contract duration. On the basis of analysis of contracts between coal suppliers and electric 
utilities Joscow argues that as relationship-specific investments become more important, the part-
ners rely more on longer-term contracts and rely less on repeated bargaining.  
Monteverde and Teece (Monteverde, 1982) tested TCE propositions on vertical integration with 
data from the US automobile industry. Their findings in accordance with TCE paradigm reveal that 
industrial know-how and the cost of transferring such know-how have a significant effect on verti-
cal integration.  
Anderson and Schmittlein drawing on TCE paradigm formulated a logistic response function to 
predict firms' decision to use sales representatives vs. a direct sales force (Anderson, 1984). The 
model, which was estimated with data from the US electronic component industry, suggests in sup-
port of TCE paradigm that vertical integration was associated with higher levels of asset specificity 
and uncertainty. Nevertheless, contrary to the TCE approach, neither frequency of transactions nor 
interaction of asset specificity and uncertainty had any significant impact on vertical integration.  
An empirical test of transaction cost theory of vertical integration was also performed under transi-
tion economy. Lazareva (Lazareva, 2004) in her study of the patterns of boundary change in Russian 
industrial sector found that the factors put forward by transaction cost theory effect the vertical in-
tegration in the way proposed by the theory.  
Summarizing, empirical research grounded on TCE theoretical framework focuses on market and 
hierarchies as mutually exclusive forms of coordination of economic activity. However, TCE's di-
chotomous view on types of transaction governance is rather limited because it leaves out a huge 
number of cooperative organizational agreements that reside between markets and hierarchies. 
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Richardson (Richardson, 1972), for instance, broadens this perspective and distinguishes three types 
of coordination of economic activity: direction; market transactions and cooperation. Cooperative 
agreements such as — repeated transactions, long-term relationships, buyer-seller partnerships, stra-
tegic alliances, joint ventures, network organizations — represent alternative to market and hierar-
chy type of transaction governance (Webster, 1992). The benefits of such cooperative agreements 
include a reduction in search costs, better working relationships, and a better understanding of the 
needs of customer.  
The failure of TCE to explain adequately these forms of coordination of economic transactions 
stems from its main behavioral assumption: "bounded rationality" and "opportunism". These as-
sumptions according to TCE affect the way in which economic exchange is governed through influ-
ence on transaction costs of writing, executing, and enforcing contracts and creating pressure to-
ward vertical integration when the level of uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency of re-
contracting is very high.  
Bradach and Eccles (Bradach, 1989), however, put forward another mechanism for coordination of 
economic activity — the trust. They state that economic transactions between actors are governed 
by three control mechanisms: price, authority and trust which map roughly onto market, hierarchy 
and relational contracting. The concept of trust that underlies relational contractual arrangements is 
itself based on social norms and personal relations (Lewis, 1985). Mitigating possibility for oppor-
tunistic behavior and reducing uncertainty, trust reduces pressure toward vertical integration 
(Granovetter, 1985). Though TCE recognizes the trust as a relevant concept (Axelrod, 1984; Chiles, 
1996; Furubotn, 2003), the influence of trust on the industry structure and its role in governing 
transactions between economic actors remained relatively unstudied within this theoretical frame-
work. To shed light on this issue, main TCE dimensions must be viewed within sociological context 
of inter-firm relations.  
2.2. Trust-related research  
The identification of trust and evaluation of its role in the context of interorganizational relations has 
received increasing attention in the sociology, business studies, management and economics literature 
in recent years. However, due to multi-disciplinary nature of the trust-related research, there is not a 
common agreement about the meaning of trust. TCE researchers, for instance, identify calculations of 
costs and benefits of certain behavior of economic agents as a basis for trust (Axelrod, 1984; Chiles, 
1996; Furubotn, 2003), while sociologists emphasize moral aspects of trust and view it as a result of 
shared norms and values (Parsons, 1951; Luhmann, 1979; Zucker, 1986; Bradach, 1989; Granovetter, 
1985). Yet another approach treats cognitions and expectations as a relevant ground for trust (Barber, 
1983; Blau, 1967; Giddens, 1984; Giddens, 1990; Sedaitis, 1997; Simmel, 1950).  
Despite these differences most concepts of trust, according to Lane share the following common 
elements:  
• trust assumes a degree of interdependence between trustor and trustee; 
• trust provides a way to cope with risk or uncertainty in exchange relationships; 
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• trust avoids vulnerability resulting from the acceptance of risk (Lane, 2002). 
These shared attributes of trust allow to consider it as an alternative governance mechanism, which 
reduces uncertainty, risk and transaction costs in interorganizational relations. Arrow emphasizing 
the role of trust as a control mechanism defines it as "…an important lubricant of a social system" 
(Arrow, 1974; p. 23). He states that "…In the absence of trust, it would become very costly to ar-
range for alternative sanctions and guarantees, and many opportunities deriving from mutually 
beneficial cooperation would have to be forgone." (Arrow, 1969; p. 62). According to Lewis and 
Weigert trust is the mutual "faithfulness" on which all social relations ultimately depend and repre-
sents functional alternative to rational prediction for the reduction of complexity: "… trust reduces 
complexity far more quickly, economically, and thoroughly than does prediction" (Lewis, 1985; 
p. 969). Macaulay (Macaulay, 1963) in his preliminary study of non-contractual relations in busi-
ness found that the norms of keeping commitments impose obligations on parties to transactions at 
the cost of damaging personal relationships. He concludes that "…while detailed planning and legal 
sanctions play a significant role in some exchanges between businesses, in many business ex-
changes their role is small" (Macaulay, 1963; p. 62). Similarly, Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman 
(Hendley, 1998) in their study of transactional strategies of Russian enterprises found that during 
transition, strategies that use trust have a critical importance as well as personal relationships. Sako 
(Sako, 2002) not only considers trust as an alternative governance mechanism but also views it as a 
precondition for superior business performance.  
To gain a better understanding of the role of trust as a transaction governance mechanism one must 
identify the sources trust is produced from. The trust-related literature distinguishes between different 
ways of trust generation. A considerable number of authors (Bradach, 1989; Granovetter, 1985; 
Lewis, 1985) view personal relations as a main source of trust. They emphasize the role of em-
beddedness of economic behavior in the social context and consider the latter as a necessary basis for 
trust to emerge between parties. For instance, Bradach and Eccles (Bradach, 1989) argue that when 
economic transactions is embedded in personal relationships based on trust, the danger of opportun-
ism is lower and the pressure toward vertical integration or elaborate formal governance structures is 
diminished. Though personal relations and familiarity are considered in the literature as important 
sources of trust the latter can also have impersonal nature. The concept of impersonal (institutional-
based or system-based) trust was introduced by Simmel (Simmel, 1950) and further developed by 
Luhmann (Luhmann, 1979), Zucker (Zucker, 1986), Shapiro (Shapiro, 1987) and Giddens (Giddens, 
1984; 1990). Trust according to this concept is generated by reliable functioning of certain systems 
(Luhmann, 1979; Giddens, 1990) or institutions (Zucker, 1986). Fukuyama defined impersonal trust 
(or rather societal trust, one of its forms) as "…the expectation that arises within a community of 
regular honest, and co-operative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other 
members of the community" (Fukuyama, 1995; p. 26). Impersonal trust is no more grounded on per-
sonal acquaintance and does not require economic transaction to be embedded in social relations.  
On the basis of distinguishing the sources of trust a number of its typologies have been developed in 
the literature to date. Studying the evolution of trust Zucker (Zucker, 1986) defined its three main 
types as follows: process-based trust, resulting from recurrent transactions and the experience 
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gained in socio-economic exchange; characteristic-based trust, grounded on social similarity be-
tween partners and not dependent on transaction experience; institutional-based trust, which goes 
beyond socio-economic exchange experience and personal relations and is generated by sound func-
tioning of formal institutions in the society. A similar typology of trust is provided by Raiser, who 
considered the following three types of trust: ascribed trust, trust between members of a kinship 
group, which arise due to friendship or family relations; process-based trust resulting from repeated 
transactions; and generalized or "extended" trust which can take place only in business environment 
characterized by the rule of law (Raiser, 1999). According to these typologies, ascribed or charac-
teristic-based and process-based forms of trust are produced only from personal relations, interac-
tions and experiences, while institutional-based trust or extended trust stems from institutional or 
system sources inherent in a particular society. To quickly summarize, in both typologies the first 
two types refer to interpersonal trust while the latter reflects the impersonal one.  
Both these authors emphasize the importance and relevance of impersonal trust for economic de-
velopment. Raiser concludes that economic transactions based on impersonal trust is an important 
determinant of the efficiency of economy functioning and is "…a key element of a modern eco-
nomic system" (Raiser, 1999; p. 4). McMillan and Woodruff (McMillan, 1999) examining trade 
credit issues in Vietnam found that in a weak contract enforcement institutional environment busi-
ness network formed by relatives or friends serves as important source of information generating 
trust and promoting exchange. However, this as well as other studies (Sedaitis, 1997; Stark, 1997) 
emphasize the fact that the ascribed and process-based trust along with facilitation of economic ex-
change within the business network restricts opportunities for economic cooperation outside of the 
created network. On the contrary, extended or generalized trust, determined by the quality of formal 
institutions in a particular society, is usually considered to be a factor that promotes cooperation be-
yond the scope of business networks (Raiser, 1999; Zak, 1998). According to Fukuyama "… a na-
tion's ability to compete is conditioned by single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust 
inherent in a society" (Fukuyama, 1995; p. 7). In this sense, for economies in transition enhancing 
quality of formal institutions represents a key challenge in the process of economic development. 
The foregoing prompts us to the understanding that trust, depending on its source, could have dif-
ferent effects on the degree and scope of cooperation between economic agents. However, no matter 
what form trust takes, it plays an important role in understanding of interorganizational transaction 
relations. This, in turn, substantiates the need for integrating trust and TCE dimensions in studying 
alternative structures of transaction governance. 
3. FACTORS OF TRANSACTION GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE:  
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The main objective of the present project is to study governance structures used by manufacturers 
and distributors to manage exchange relations and identify salient variables that determine firms' 
choice of the appropriate transaction governance modes.  
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The review of the existing literature presented in the previous section reveals the necessity for two 
important modifications to traditional TCE approach in studying transaction governance structures. 
First, instead of viewing transaction modes as dichotomous, three different types of governance 
forms will be examined: market governance, relational transacting, and hierarchical governance. 
Second, a new dimension — trust — must be added to the main TCE dimensions to understand 
firms' choice of an alternative governance structure. 
However, methodological difficulties in distinguishing between arms-length relations and relational 
contracting compel us to divide the study in two consecutive phases. During the first phase, vari-
ables that influence manufacturer's choice from two alternatives will be studied, viz., in-house per-
formance of distribution vs. contracting distribution out. The next phase will be devoted to the ex-
ploration of relational transactions between manufacturers and distributors. 
3.1. Vertical integration vs. contracting out  
The first stage of the study draws mainly on the sales force integration model elaborated by Ander-
son and Schmittlein (Anderson, 1984) with some modifications. At this phase of the study two dis-
crete forms of transaction governance are distinguished: 
Markets — involves the use of independent distributors by manufacturer for performing of sales 
function.  In the context of present research this type of governance includes both arms-length rela-
tions and relational governance.  
Hierarchies — implies vertical integration of distribution function by manufacturers. Instead of 
employing independent distributors, manufacturer distributes produced goods using direct selling 
personnel.  
The insights from empirical literature review permit us to study the following variables as determi-
nants of alternative governance modes: asset specificity, uncertainty, and firm's size. In line with the 
objectives of the study, we added trust as a possible determinant of a firm's choice to traditional 
TCE dimensions.  
Asset specificity — reflects the degree to which an asset is customized to the user's need or the de-
gree to which it can be redeployed to alternative uses. Williamson (Williamson, 1996) distinguishes 
the following six types of asset specificity: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset 
specificity, dedicated assets, brand name capital, and temporal specificity. To define this variable in 
our analysis, following Anderson and Schmittlein (Anderson, 1984), we apply specialized human 
assets, which reflect knowledge, capabilities, relationships idiosyncratically related to manufacturer 
or its customer. TCE theoretical framework and empirical examination suggest that high level of 
asset specificity creates pressure toward vertical integration (Anderson, 1984; Crocker, 1993; 
Joscow, 1987; Monteverde, 1982; Shepard, 1993; Williamson, 1996).  
Uncertainty — refers to the level availability of information necessary for making key decisions 
and predicting consequences of these decisions. One of the key uncertainties pertaining to buyer-
seller relationship refers to difficulties of performance evaluation or metering (Alchian, 1972; Wil-
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liamson, 1981). Anderson and Schmittlein (Anderson, 1984) found a positive relationship between 
difficulty of monitoring performance and the likelihood of vertical integration.  
Size of the firm- another factor which impacts vertical integration has been found to be significant in 
empirical studies (Anderson, 1984; Williamson, 1985). The inclusion of size in studying transaction 
governance modes is based on the consideration of scale and scope of economy.  
Trust. On the basis of the literature review (Arrow, 1969; Raiser, 1999; Joscow, 1987; Anderson, 
1990; Bradach, 1989) and for the sake of current research trust is defined here as informal mecha-
nism for coordination of economic activity, alternative and supplementary to price and authority, 
based on the belief of one party in honest and predictable behavior of the other party, and which 
allows for more effective and flexible mode of transaction governance. We assume that such a belief 
can be formed by mechanisms of personal relations on the one hand and confidence in legal and 
collective institutions on the other. However, in this paper we distinguish between two types of trust 
not on the basis of its sources but rather on its effect on the degree and scope of cooperation be-
tween economic agents. In particular, we consider the following two types of trust in this study: 
network trust and extended trust.  
Network trust — arises from personal acquaintance, friendship or family relations, recommendation 
and information received from the former or current employees, business associations and govern-
ment agencies. This type of trust could be personal and is similar to the ascribed (Raiser, 1999) or 
characteristic-based trust (Zucker, 1986) if the network is comprised of friends and relatives. It 
could also have impersonal nature and contain some features of the institutional-based trust 
(Zucker, 1986) if the partner is chosen on the basis of recommendations by business associations or 
governmental agencies. In this case the basis for trust is the confidence in local institutions (like 
business associations). However, whether the trust is personal or impersonal, it does not extend the 
boundaries of the existing networks. This is a distinctive feature of the network trust.  
Extended trust — is a product of sound functioning of formal institutions that establish business en-
vironment characterized by the rule of law and is no more restricted to a certain network. On the 
contrary extended trust derives from confidence in collective and system institutions and is avail-
able to all economic agents. It is similar to extended or generalized trust defined by Raiser (Raiser, 
1999) and contains the major features of institutional-based trust (Zucker, 1986), system trust 
(Simmel, 1950; Giddens, 1990) and societal trust (Fukuyama, 1995). 
In both the cases, trust represents a mechanism that facilitates relationships between organizations 
through alleviating the fear that one's exchange partner will act opportunistically. The ability to trust 
is related to the amount of uncertainty and the presence of risk for opportunism (Bradach, 1989). 
Diminishing opportunism trust reduces the pressure toward vertical integration caused by high asset 
specificity and uncertainty. Based upon theoretical and empirical findings we hypothesize:  
H1: The greater the degree of specificity of knowledge and capabilities related to performing of 
selling function by a particular manufacturer company, the higher the probability that the 
manufacturer will choose hierarchical governance mode.  
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H2: The greater the difficulty of measuring individual salesperson performance, the higher the 
probability that the manufacturer will choose hierarchical governance mode.  
H3: The greater the size of manufacturer company, the higher the probability that the manufacturer 
will choose hierarchical governance mode.  
H4: The greater the level of network trust, the lower the probability that the manufacturer will 
choose hierarchical governance mode.  
H5: The greater the level of extended trust, the lower the probability that the manufacturer will 
choose hierarchical governance mode.  
3.2. The determinants of relational transacting  
At this stage of the research, we will examine the factors that force business partners to move from 
arms-length transactions to relational transactions.  
Relational transacting — refers to intermediate trust-based form of cooperative arrangement. This 
form is governed by implicit social norms of inter-organizational behavior and involves relatively 
less complex and less formal contractual arrangements between business parties (Webster, 1992). In 
this study two dimensions of relational transacting are identified: percentage of manufacturer's 
sales that are prepaid; and the level of completeness of the contract (in number of pages). Higher 
level of relational transacting is associated with lower levels of percentage of sales prepayment, 
and less contract completeness. For the sake of current research the following variables are consid-
ered as main determinants of relational transacting: asset specificity, uncertainty, network and ex-
tended trust. 
According to empirical findings in TCE literature, asset specificity and uncertainty create pressure 
toward adopting of more specified and lengthy contracts (Crocker, 1993; Joscow, 1987). A number 
of trust-based studies revealed a significant positive effect of trust on stability of cooperative rela-
tionship (Moorman, 1993; Morgan, 1994), effectiveness of distributor and manufacturer firms 
working partnerships (Anderson, 1990), effectiveness of selling partner relationships (Smith, 1997). 
In these and other studies trust has been identified as a condition for cooperation and prerequisite 
for successful relational contracting, which, in turn, requires lower levels of contract formalization 
and completeness, and thereby reduces transaction costs (Johnson, 1997; McMillan, 1999; Raiser, 
2004). Hence: 
H6a: The greater the degree of specificity of knowledge and capabilities related to performing of 
selling function by a particular manufacturer company, the higher the percentage of manufac-
turer's sales that is prepaid. 
H6b: The greater the degree of specificity of knowledge and capabilities related to performing of 
selling function by a particular manufacturer company, the higher the level of contract com-
pleteness.  
H7a: The greater the difficulty of measuring individual salesperson performance, the higher the 
percentage of manufacturer's sales that is prepaid. 
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H7b: The greater the difficulty of measuring individual salesperson performance, the higher the 
level of contract completeness.  
H8a: The greater the level of network trust, the lower the percentage of manufacturer's sales that is 
prepaid.  
H8b: The greater the level of network trust, the lower the level of contract completeness.  
H9a: The greater the level of extended trust, the lower the percentage of manufacturer's sales that is 
prepaid.  
H9b: The greater the level of extended trust, the lower the levels of contract completeness.  
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section describes data collection and sample description, description of measures, and model 
specification. 
4.1. Data and Sample Description  
The hypotheses formulated in the previous part of the study were tested on survey data from a sam-
ple of Georgian manufacturing firms. The level of analysis in the study was a manufacturer-
distributor relationship. According to the research objectives the key informant method was used for 
obtaining data from manufacturer's side of dyadic relationship (Campbell, 1955). This method al-
lowed us to obtain all the information necessary from a single respondent, who, being an expert 
provided generalizable judgments. To guarantee the competence of key informants we contacted 
heads of marketing/sales departments or heads of firms (when the firm was too small to have any 
departments). We asked respondents to answer the questions regarding their companies' typical 
product they were familiar with, which was marketed through their major distributor.  
Data collection has been conducted through a personal interview survey. We had attempted a pre-
liminary pilot study (15 informants), aiming to refine the wording of the scale items in the ques-
tionnaire before the main survey. The sample, comprised of 301 enterprises, was selected from 
2920 manufactures listed in the database of the Georgian Department for Statistics. The sampling 
procedure was as follows: first, to decrease the cost of survey we selected four main industrial cen-
ters in Georgia: Tbilisi, Rustavi, Kutaisi, and Gori. For the same reason we selected 2/3 of the sam-
ple in Tbilisi and the rest of the sample outside the capital. In each of the industrial centers a ran-
dom sample has been drawn (on n-th name basis, which actually was different for each of the indus-
trial centers), with every company having an equal and pre-determined chance of being selected 
within each region.  
The figures of regional distribution of the sample presented in Table 1 (see Appendix A1) shows 
that the sample is dominated by firms located in Tbilisi, the capital (2/3 of the sample), followed by 
Kutaisi (16.6%), Rustavi (10%) and Gori (6.7%). According to Fig. 1 (see Appendix A2), which 
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compares sample's regional distribution of companies with that of population, companies located in 
the capital are overrepresented by almost 100%, while representation of companies outside the capi-
tal is more or less even (Statistical Yearbook of Georgia, 2004). The overrepresentation of Tbilisi 
based firms is basically due to regions not included in the sample. Allowing for peculiarities of the 
tested hypotheses, we have assumed that this distortion in firms' regional distribution will not have 
a significant impact on generalizability of the research findings.  
Distribution by Industry. To guarantee generalizability of the findings across industries the database 
covered different industry groups. Table 2 shows that the sample is dominated by producers of 
foodstuffs and beverages (55.8%). This figure, however, is only 2.2% less than that for the popula-
tion. In general, the comparison of the sample and population, presented in Fig. 2, reveals virtually 
no significant divergence from industry structures, with the exception of manufacturers of tim-
ber/timber products (Statistical Yearbook of Georgia, 2004). It is important that almost all the in-
dustries are well-represented in the sample.  
Distribution by Size. The same is true of companies' distribution by size, measured by the number 
of staff (without sales department staff). Sample statistics shown in table 3 reflects great domination 
of small firms. However, representation of each category of enterprises in the sample is practically 
identical to that of the population, as shown in the Fig. 3 (Industry in Georgia, 2005). Sample statis-
tics for small and large firms are respectively overrepresented or underrepresented only by 1.1%, 
while the share of medium enterprises is proportionate with the population.  
Ownership Structure. The ownership structure of sampled companies is shown in Fig. 4. The over-
whelming majority of the sample is represented by newly established private enterprises (80.1%) 
while state enterprises constitute only 1.3% of the sample. Almost 31% (93) of the enterprises were 
established within the last three years.  
4.2. Measures  
Questionnaire protocol served as the primary means for the data collection. Most of the scales em-
ployed in the study are adapted from existing scales to suit the context of the present research.  
A complete listing of the scales used in the study is provided in Appendix A3.  
4.2.1. Dependent variable. The analysis involves two consecutive stages (Vertical integration vs. 
outsource distribution; and relational transacting estimation). Each stage differs mainly by depend-
ent variables involved in the study. 
At the initial stage of the study the decision of the firm to use a certain transaction governance mode 
is measured by a discrete dependent variable. In the theoretical part of the paper two different types 
of transaction governance are distinguished: markets and hierarchy.  
Market governance here refers to outside contracting of distribution function and includes both 
arms-length transactions and relational governance. 
Hierarchical governance assumes using direct sales force of a manufacturer firm.  
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In this study we asked manufacturers to choose one type of distribution form (more than 75% of 
total distribution) out of five alternatives: their own sales department, their own sales company, 
franchise, exclusive dealers, and  independent distributors. In the context of this study, the first two 
types are referred to as in-house performance of distribution function, and the last three as external 
ones. These categories of transaction governance choice were coded 1, 0 respectively.  
At the second stage of the study continuous dependent variable reflects the degree of intensity of 
relationship between a manufacturer and its distributor. Two dimensions were used in this study to 
capture this construct: 
Prepayment (PP) — percentage of firm's sales that is prepaid. 
Contract completeness (COMPL) — measured in numbers of pages of the written contract. 
4.2.2. Independent variables. The following variables are hypothesized to influence a manufac-
turer firm's choice of transaction governance mode: asset specificity; uncertainty, size of the firm; 
and trust.  
Asset Specificity. We measured asset specificity (AS) using four questions, each employing 7-point 
scale adapted from Anderson and Schmittlein (Anderson, 1984). We asked respondents about the 
degree to which they agreed with four statements representing their perception of nature of the 
company, confidentiality of information, nature of the customer and customer loyalty. The only ex-
ception was made for the fourth item, which was measured on a reversed scale. The asset specificity 
(AS) variable was constructed from responses to the questions listed above using factor analysis 
(principal components method). Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 summarize the factor analysis results for these 
asset specificity measures. The appropriateness of factor analysis was verified by sufficient level of 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (0.787) and the significance of Bartlett's Test 
of Sphericity (p < 0.001) (Table 4). Evaluation of communalities (Table 5) suggests that the propor-
tion of the variance in the original variables that is accounted for by the factor solution is more than 
0.50 for each of the variables. Thus no variable has been excluded, which completes factor analysis. 
As a result of this analysis we arrived at one component solution, which explained 63.068% of the 
total variance in the variables included in the component (Table 6). All the variables have high 
loadings (more than 0.7) on the component confirming goodness of the factor solution (Table 7). 
Further, we validated these results by conducting analysis into each half of the sample. The results 
of these two split sample analyses were compared with the analysis of the full data set (Tables 8, 9). 
All of the communalities in both validation samples met the criteria. The pattern of loadings for 
both validation samples is the same, and the same as the pattern for the analysis using the full sam-
ple. This validation analysis supports a finding that the results of this principal component factor 
analysis are generalizable to the population represented by this data set. Next internal consistency of 
the new construct was tested using reliability analysis (the fourth item of the scale has been reversed 
in advance). Results of reliability analysis (Table 10) shows that the internal consistency of the con-
struct cannot be improved further by removal of one of the variables. Chronbach's alpha of 0.80 
suggests that the construct has a high internal consistency. Examination of factor scores revealed no 
outliers. These factor scores will be used further in regression analysis for testing of the hypothesis. 
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Uncertainty (U). This variable is also adapted from Anderson and Schmittlein (Anderson, 1984) 
and measures the difficulty to evaluate salesperson's performance, as perceived by manufacturer, 
using one-item scale. Respondents were questioned about the degree to which they agreed with the 
statement, which reflected their perception of uncertainty in measuring distributors' performance on 
a 7-point scale, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".  
Firm size (S). We estimate this variable by the number of staff at a manufacturer firm (excluding the 
size of sales department) in 2005.1 Later, however, we use the natural logarithm of this variable is 
used in regression equations.  
Trust. In the theoretical part of this study two trust dimensions were distinguished: network and ex-
tended trust. The following proxies were used to measure these concepts2.  
Extended Trust — is measured using the following two proxies that reflect the level of development 
of formal institutions as perceived by managers: 
General trust (GT) — trust is not specific to this relationship;  
Confidence in courts (CC) — indicates manufacturer's current perception of the reliability of legal 
enforcement institutions. 
Each of these extended trust variables are measured with one-item scale. The key informants were 
asked to express the degree of their agreement with the corresponding statement in the question-
naire on a 7-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly disagree". 
Network trust — trust existing due to common family ties, origin from the same municipality and 
etc., was measured using 6-point scale. On a 5-point scale ranging from extremely important =1 to 
not important =5 respondents rated the importance of the following sources of information on new 
distributors: family, friends, former colleagues of potential distributors, current distributors, gov-
ernment agencies, and business associations. The analysis into a correlation matrix (Table 11) for 
these variables substantiates the necessity for factor analysis. 
The results of principal components factor analysis shown in Table 12 verifies the appropriateness 
of factor analysis (Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy — 0.610 and Bartlett's 
Test of Sphericity is significant at p < 0.001). On iteration 1, the communality for the variable "for-
mer colleagues" was 0.481 (Table 13). Since this is less than 0.50, we removed the variable from 
the next iteration and carried out the principal component analysis again.  
Evaluation of communalities at second iteration (Table 14) suggests that the proportion of the vari-
ance in the original variables that is accounted for by the factor solution is more than 0.50 for each 
of the variables. As a result of this analysis we got two component solution that explained 80.107% 
                                                 
1 We used this measure instead of company assets proposed by Anderson and Schmittlein (1984), because the true value 
of this variable may as well not be seen. 
2 These scales are adapted from Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey Questionnaire 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps2002/ 
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of the total variance in the variables included in the components (Table 15). Analysis of rotated 
component matrix (Varimax rotation) shows that on iteration 2, none of the variables demonstrated 
complex structure (Table 16) and the two components in the analysis had more than one variable 
loading on each of them. Component 1 includes variables of current distributors, business associa-
tions, and government agencies. Component 2 includes variables of family and friends. No variables 
need to be removed at this stage because of complex structure.  
The results of split sample validation are presented in Tables 17, 18. The review of communalities 
and loading patterns indicates that all criteria are met in both validation samples supporting gener-
alizability of factor analysis results. Also reliability analysis of the constructs (Table 19) shows that 
internal consistency of both components are sufficient (Chronbach's alpha = 0.8120 and 0.8597 cor-
respondingly for the first and 2 components). Though reliability of the first component could be im-
proved by removal of the current distributors variable (Chronbach's alpha = 0.8974), we decided to 
retain it for the purpose of our study.  
Clear structure of loadings allows for straightforward interpretation of factor analysis results. Be-
cause government agencies, business associations, and current distributors, which represent outside 
sources of information, load highly on the first component, and family and friends, which represent 
inside sources of information, load highly on the second component, we define these components 
correspondingly as "Outer network" (ON) and "Inner network" (IN).  
Inner network (IN) — personal trust within partnership derives from relatives and friends. 
Outer network (ON) — impersonal trust derives from recommendations of business associations 
and governmental agencies. 
4.2.3. Control variables. These variables are included in the empirical model in order to prevent 
detection of false significant correlation between dependent and independent variables, which is due 
to their correlation with omitted variable. 
Market power (MP) — availability of alternative sources for the distributor. The distributor can be 
more trusted if he is dependent on the manufacturer. 
Origin of the firm (OR) — indicates whether the firm existed in the Soviet period or had a predeces-
sor then.  
History of business relationship (HBR) — can influence the level of trust through confidence in 
business partner built up from repeated transactions and cooperation in the past.  
Industry type (Ind) — is measured by dummy variables and is included to capture the industry ef-
fect on the transaction governance mode. Initially, we had fourteen different industries in our data 
sample (Table 2). Because number of cases for some industries was too small we combined some of 
them (manufacture of food and beverages with tobacco products; manufacture of textiles with 
manufacture of wearing apparel; manufacture of fabricated metals with manufacture of machinery 
and equipment) receiving finally 11 industries. 
Auxiliary function (AUX) — reflects whether external distribution is the main or auxiliary form of 
governance. This variable is coded as dummy variable. 
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4.2.4. Instrumental variables. These variables are included into the study to tackle the problem of 
possible endogeneity of trust variables.  
Confidence in courts at an earlier point in time (CCE) — indicates manufacturer's perception of the 
reliability of the legal enforcement institutions at an earlier point in time. This instrument is meas-
ured by 1-item scale. The key informants were asked to express the degree of their agreement with 
the corresponding statement in the questionnaire on a 7-point scale. 
Possibility for manufacturer to create an inner network (PCIN) — indicates whether manufacturer 
had possibility to create network with friends, family members by the moment the governance 
structure was being developed3. 
Possibility for manufacturer to create an outer network (PCON) — indicates whether manufacturer 
had possibility to create network with distributors recommended by business associations and gov-
ernment agencies by the moment the governance structure was being developed. 
The key informants were asked to express the degree of their agreement with the corresponding 
statement in the questionnaire on a 7-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly dis-
agree". 
4.3. Model Specification  
For the purposes of the present research two different approaches were explored in this paper. The 
first one is focused on the study of the impact of TCE variables, firm size and trust variables on the 
firm's choice of transaction governance forms (markets vs. hierarchies), while the other is con-
cerned with the analysis into the effect of TCE variables and trust variables on the degree of rela-
tional transacting.  
4.3.1. Vertical integration vs. contracting out. Two models are employed to study the effect of 
trust and TCE variables on manufacturers' choice of governance mode in the paper. These are: 
Logit model and Two-stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood Probit analysis. 
Logit Model. Logit model was applied as the estimation techniques (Green, 1993; McFadden, 1984) 
at the first stage of this study. Let's denote the vector of explanatory variables for subject i as xi, 
then the probability that subject i will choose hierarchical transaction governance mode can be de-
termined as 
 ( )
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Linear transformation of this equation leads to the following logit function:  
 '1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
log( ) CCp AS U S ON IN GT Z
p
β β β β β β β β γ= + + + + + + + + , (2) 
                                                 
3Subsidiary survey on the same sample has been conducted to work out these variables. 
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where AS, U, S, ON, IN, GT, and CC are independent variables discussed earlier, Z is a vector of 
control variables, β and γ are parameters to be estimated. The coefficients of the model were esti-
mated through maximizing the log likelihood function: 
 ( ) [ ] [ ] ii yiiyiiN
i
ii xyPxyPxyL
−
=
=−==∏ 1
1
)|11(|1;;| γβ , (3) 
where N is the number of subjects on which data have been collected (Green, 1993). This function 
was maximized through the Newton-Raphson algorithm used by the SPSS program.  
Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood Probit Analysis. There are, however, potential prob-
lems with measuring of the effect of trust which could arise from the endogeneity of this variable 
related to possible reciprocal causation between trust variables and dependent variables. In dealing 
with this problem we cannot apply the conventional two-stage least square estimation models 
(Green, 1993) as the dependent variable in our study is discrete. One of the alternative ways that 
can be employed in this situation is the Two-stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood Probit 
(2SCML) developed by Rivers and Vuong (Rivers, 1988). This approach allows to control for en-
dogeneity arising from possible reciprocal causation between choice of governance mode and con-
tinuous variables of interest: extended trust and network trust. The 2SCML procedure applied to 
probit analysis can be described as follows. First, consider the following probit model 
 *1 1 1 1 2 1y X Yα β ε= + + , (4) 
 
*
1 1
*
1 1
1 [ 0],
0 [ 0],
y y
y y
⎧ = >⎨ = <⎩  (5) 
where *1y  is an unobserved latent variable (manufacturers' choice of governance mode), 1X  is a set 
of exogenous variables (TCE variables general, general trust (GT) and control variables), 2Y  is a set 
of continuous endogenous variables (confidence in courts (CC), inner networks (IN), and outer net-
works (ON)). Each of the continuous endogenous variables in the 2Y  set is modeled as  
 21 1 22 2 2 ,CC X Xα α ε= + +  (6) 
 31 1 32 2 3,IN X Xα α ε= + +  (7) 
 41 1 42 2 4 ,ON X Xα α ε= + +  (8) 
where 1X  is a set of exogenous variables (TCE variables and control variables), 2X  is a set of ex-
ogenous variables not included in the equation (4), which serve as instruments for the endogenous 
variables (confidence in courts at earlier point in time (CCE), possibility to create inner network 
(PCIN), and possibility to create outer network (PCON). The endogeneity in the model arises from 
the correlation of variables in the 2Y  with 1ε . Following Rivers and Vuong (Rivers and Vuong, 
1988) procedure and assuming that ( 1ε , 2ε , 3ε , 4ε ) the errors in the equation (4) and (6)–(8) have a 
zero mean as well as bivariate normal distribution, are independent of X, and Var( 1ε ) equals 1, we 
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can demonstrate that 
 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 1eε θ ε θ ε θ ε= + + +  (9) 
or  
 *1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 4 1y X Y eα β θ ε θ ε θ ε= + + + + + . (10) 
Equation (10) can be estimated using two-stage approach (Rivers, 1988). At the first stage, we get 
residuals ( 2eˆ , 3ˆe , 4eˆ ) estimating equation (6)–(8) through OLS regressions of the endogenous vari-
ables 2Y , on the full set of exogenous variables 1X  and 2X . At the next stage, we get consistent es-
timators of the probit equation running the probit 1y on 1X , 2Y  and saved residuals ( 2eˆ , 3ˆe , 4eˆ ). An 
advantage of this two-stage approach is that probit t statistics on ( 2eˆ , 3ˆe , 4eˆ ) are valid tests of the 
null hypothesis that 2Y  is exogenous, i.e.,  
 H0: θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 0.  
If this condition does not hold, 2Y  is endogenous and the usual probit standard errors are not valid. 
4.3.2 Relational Transacting. Two alternative models will be employed to study the effects of 
TCE and trust variables on the relational governance. These models are: system of seemingly unre-
lated regressions and Tobit regression. 
System of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. As the theoretical part of the study identifies two di-
mensions of the dependent variable, we developed the following two regression equations:  
 '10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1CCPP AS U ON IN GT Zα α α α α α α η= + + + + + + + , (11) 
 20 21 22 23 24 25 26CCCOMPL AS U ON IN GTα α α α α α α η= + + + + + + + , (12) 
where PP, and COMPL are dependent variables; AS, U, ON, IN, GT, and CC are independent vari-
ables discussed earlier; Z is a vector of control variables, α and η are parameters to be estimated. 
These regressions were estimated as a system using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) proce-
dure of STATA software. The seemingly unrelated regression represents a special case of the gen-
eralized regression model (Zellner, 1962).  The basic SUR model assumes that, for each individual 
observation i, there are M dependent variables (j = 1, ..., M) and M linear regression equations: 
 'ij ij j ijy x β ε= + . (13) 
Though the standard conditions for the classical regression model are assumed to hold for each j, 
the SUR model permits nonzero covariance between the error terms for a given individual across 
different equations, while assuming zero covariance between different individuals. Taking into ac-
count potential covariance across equations allows for asymptotically more efficient estimates than 
ordinal least-squares estimates. 
Tobit Model. Main justification for conducting Tobit regressions is that both dependent variables in 
this study are left-censored and have many zeros. The general formulation of Tobit function is as 
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follows (Green, 1993):  
 * 'i i iy xβ ε= + , (14) 
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⎧ = ≤⎨ = >⎩  (15) 
where ix  is a vector of regressors for subject i, and the error term iε  is N ( 2,0 σ ) distributed, condi-
tionally on ix . This model is estimated through maximizing the log likelihood function: 
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Maximization of this function was accomplished through the Newton algorithm. 
5. STUDY RESULTS 
5.1. Vertical integration vs. contracting out  
In this study we revealed the following four types of organizing distribution function that were used 
by Georgian manufacturers: their own sales department; their own sales company, exclusive deal-
ers; and independent distributors. In the context of this study, the first two types are referred to as 
in-house performance of distribution function, and the last two as external ones. According to the 
results of the survey over 75% of manufacturer firms (228 enterprises) prefer to organize distribu-
tion function in-house, and 13% of them (30 enterprises) use independent distributors as an auxil-
iary form of distribution. Fig. 5 shows that during the last three years' period there has been no sig-
nificant change in the relative shares of various forms of distribution function organization. The 
share of in-house distribution form increased only slightly (1.2%) during the period. According to 
Fig. 6 about 5% of those firms that used in-house distribution three years ago switched currently to 
external form of distribution, and 11% of those that outsourced distribution have integrated this 
function into their companies by now.  
Logit model. Table 20 reports the parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit indicators for three logit 
models. The first model includes aggregated factor — outer network (ON), while in the second and 
third models this factor is replaced by its composite variables. These variables are correspondingly 
trust in government agencies (GA) and trust in business associations (BA)4. All three models reflect 
a good fit with the data (Model Chi-square significant at p < 0.01; Cox and Snell's R-Square more 
than 0.420; and Nagelkerke's R-Square more than = 0.630; almost 91% of the Overall Percentage of 
Correct Predictions). In conformity with TCE theoretical paradigm asset specificity (AS) and uncer-
                                                 
4 Due to the high policy relevance of these variables separate regressions were run for each of them. 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
23
tainty (U) were found to have positive significant effect on vertical integration (H1 and H2 sup-
ported at the significance level p < 0.01 in all three models). Size (S) has negative effect (at the sig-
nificance level p < 0.01 in the first two models and at p < 0.05 in the third model) on the choice of 
hierarchical distribution mode thus rejecting H3 hypothesis. Outer networks (ON) and inner net-
works (IN) variables as well as trust in government agencies (GA) and trust in business associations 
(BA) were found to be significant predictors of manufacturers' choice, thus supporting H4 hypothe-
sis at the significance level: p < 0.01. However, none of the two extended trust variables (general 
trust (GT); confidence in courts (CC)) was significantly related to the dependent variable and as a 
consequence H5 has been rejected.  
2SCML Probit Analysis.5 We start by briefly discussing the first stage of this procedure. This stage 
consists of three OLS regressions of trust variables (confidence in courts (CC), inner networks (IN), 
and outer networks (ON)) on all the exogenous variables. Three variables, excluded from the struc-
tural models but added to the reduced model to predict the endogenous variables, are confidence in 
courts at earlier point in time (CCE), possibility for manufacturer to create an inner network 
(PCIN), and possibility for a manufacturer to create an outer network (PCON). Table 21 shows the 
results for the reduced form estimates. All the three equations have R-square higher than 0.5 and  
F-statistic significant at p < 0.01 level. The F statistic for excluded variables is also significant at  
p < 0.01 level. As expected confidence in courts at earlier point in time (CCE), possibility for 
manufacturer to create an inner network (PCIN), and possibility for manufacturer to create an outer 
network (PCON) have positive influence on confidence in courts (CC), inner networks (IN), and 
outer networks (ON) respectively, and are significant at p < 0.01 level. PCIN has also significant 
negative impact on the confidence in courts (CC). TCE variables, viz., asset specificity (AS) and 
uncertainty (U) are significantly and negatively related to outer networks (ON). There is some evi-
dence that state-owned enterprises have higher confidence in courts than those of other forms of 
ownership. 
The results for the second stage of the 2SCML estimation are presented in Table 22. Model 1 is the 
structural model that is used to test for the existence of endogeneity. The endogeneity controls for 
confidence in courts (CC), inner networks (IN), and outer networks (ON) are insignificant in the 
structural model, as coefficients (θ) of the residuals from the first stage regressions are insignificant. 
This allows us to accept the null hypotheses of no endogeneity. Further, we exclude these controls 
in the final probit model (Model 2) and treat confidence in courts (CC), inner networks (IN), and 
outer networks (ON) as ordinary exogenous variables. As is seen from the last column of Table 22 
the significance of the impact of network trust variables on the choice of governance mode has not 
changed substantially as compared to Model 1. On the whole the results of the probit model are 
similar to those of the logit model examined earlier, thus supporting research hypotheses as in Logit 
model. 
                                                 
5 Data on instrumental variables PCIN and PCON was collected only after 6 months after the main survey. The re-
sponse rate was 194 out of 301 firms. 
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5.2. Relational Transacting between Manufacturers and Distributors  
For the study of relational transacting from the total sample we selected only the companies that use 
outsource distribution organization mode. Among 103 companies selected for the study 73 (70.9%) 
use outsource organization as a main form of distribution, and the others use it as auxiliary to in-
house distribution. The study revealed that manufacturers in their relations with distributors mainly 
use the following control mechanisms: prepayments and formal contracts. Descriptive statistics for 
amount of prepayments, term of contracts in months (contract duration), and length of contracts in 
numbers of pages (contract completeness) are presented in tables 23, 24, 25 respectively. Prepay-
ments are used by 38 out of 100 manufacturers (3 cases are system missing), and among them 13 
manufacturers demand less than 50% of prepayment, 12 of them demand more than 50% but less 
than 100%, while 11 manufacturers demand full prepayment. Formal contracts are used by 83 
(82.2%) out of 101 manufacturers (2 cases are system missing). Most frequent occurrence in the 
sample is one year contract — 69 cases (68.3%). Manufacturers also prefer to sign one-page 
(25.7%), two-page (31.7%), or three-page (11.8%) contracts with distributors. According to Fig. 7, 
12% of manufacturers use no control mechanisms, 50% rely only on formal contract, 6% demand 
only prepayment, while 32% use both prepayment and formal contracts as mechanisms of control in 
their relations with distributors. 
System of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) and Tobit regressions were used to test hypothe-
ses on the association between trust, TCE factors and the intensity of relationship between manufac-
turers and distributors. Table 26 shows results of SUR and Tobit analysis. The main drawback of 
this study is a small sample size: only 103 companies use outsource distribution form either as a 
major or auxiliary means of distribution. This problem is further aggravated by missing values for 
some variables (mainly extended trust variables).  
For all regressions Model 1 includes aggregated factor — outer network (ON), Model 2 and Model 
3 incorporate trust in government agencies (GA) and trust in business associations (BA) variables 
respectively. For prepayment SUR regressions chi-square is significant at p < 0.01 in all models, 
and for contract completeness it is significant at p < 0.01 in the first model and at p < 0.05 in the 
rest of models. Similarly, for all prepayment Tobit regressions LR chi-square is significant at  
p < 0.01, for contract completeness it is significant at p < 0.05 in the first two models and at p < 0.1 
in the third one. 
SUR models do not support H6 and H9 hypotheses absolutely. Neither asset specificity, nor ex-
tended trust variables have any significant effect on amount of prepayment or contract complete-
ness. Uncertainty has influence only on amount of prepayment at 5% significance level in all mod-
els (supporting H7a at p < 0.05 level), while this factor is insignificant in completeness equations 
(H7b is rejected). Generally SUR and Tobit regressions show similar results. H8 holds out in almost 
all models. Outer network as well as trust in government agencies and trust in business associations 
variables are significant at p < 0.01 level for all equations in all the models. Inner networks variable 
is significant at p < 0.01 for prepayment regression in all the models, thus supporting H8a. For con-
tract completeness equation this variable is significant only in the first two models of SUR and To-
bit regressions at p < 0.1 level.  
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6. DISCUSSION 
This study explores the forces that have impact on manufacturers' choice of types of transactions 
with distributors. Our objective was to show that some other factors in addition to TCE variables 
can affect transaction costs and influence a company's choice of whether or not to integrate. More 
specifically, we tried to examine the role that trust plays in the contexts of manufacturers' choice of 
transaction governance mode and manufacturer-distributor relationships.  
The results of empirical study suggest that manufacturers' choice of engaging distributors was de-
termined by the following set of factors: asset specificity (the degree to which an asset is custom-
ized to the user's needs or the degree to which it can be redeployed to alternative uses), uncertainty 
(the level availability of information necessary for making key decisions and predicting conse-
quences thereof) and trust. Trust in this study was treated as a product of certain informal and for-
mal institutions, e.g. kinship norms and legal environment. We distinguished between network trust 
(trust arising from friendship or family relations, recommendation and information received from 
former or current colleagues, business associations and government agencies) and extended trust (a 
product of sound functioning of formal institutions that establish business environment subject to 
the rule of law). During the study we found that the network trust, in turn, could be subdivided into 
inner networks (networks comprised of only friends and relatives) and outer networks (networks, 
which incorporate independent distributors recommended by business associations and government 
agencies). 
We found that the rise in the levels of asset specificity and uncertainty increase the probability of 
in-house performance of distribution function by manufacturer. Both network trust variables in-
crease producer firms' willingness to employ external distributors. These findings extend TCE theo-
retical paradigm by demonstrating that network trust along with TCE variables influences manufac-
turers' choice of transaction governance mode. These findings are theoretically consistent with 
Bradach and Eccels' (Bradach, 1989) understanding of trust as a third mechanism of social control 
in addition to market and hierarchy. Not only does network trust help to explain a manufacturer's 
vertical integration choice, but also explains variation in intensity of relationships between manu-
facturers and distributors. Higher level of trust existing between partners leads to less complete con-
tracts and lower prepayment requirements, reducing thus transaction cost and facilitating economic 
exchange. This finding parallels in part with results reported in Raiser (Raiser, 2004), who suggests 
that network variables have a negative impact on the amount of prepayment.  
However, we failed to find any significant effect of such policy relevant factor as extended trust (of 
which main determinant is the reliability of legal institutions). None of the variables used in this 
study as proxies for extended trust had any significant effect on manufacturers' choice of govern-
ance mode or on the intensity of relationship between partners. We presume that this is mainly due 
to the fact that our study was limited to one country. Objectively, degree of rule of law and quality 
of legal institutions that are determinants of extended trust could barely vary within the same coun-
try. Variation in these variables can be explained by factors other than the legal environment or 
those irrelevant to study of transaction governance choice. Support for this assertion comes from 
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Raiser's empirical findings regarding trust in transition, contending that a legal system's influence 
on the amount of prepayment is significant in a cross-country study, while being insignificant in a 
within-country study (Raiser, 2004). 
The importance of the study findings could be better seen in the context of economic advantages of 
trust-based governance modes. Higher levels of in-house performance of distribution function by 
manufacturers means fewer opportunities to gain benefits from specialization and cooperation. Fur-
thermore, increase in the complexity of contract arrangements between manufacturers and distribu-
tors in the form of required amount of prepayments and degree of completeness increases the costs 
of making transactions and lowers economic efficiency. All these factors could impede possibilities 
for a country's economic growth. A proper understanding of the role of trust could be important, 
especially to creating the adequate institutional environment in Georgia. For instance, amongst the 
countries in transition, Georgia experienced the highest percentage of cumulative output decline 
(78%) and had the lowest level of real GDP in 2000 as compared to 1990 (29%) (World Bank, 
2002). Among the reasons that hampered the achievement of economic prosperity in Georgia, lack 
of formal as well as informal market institutions, which could lower transaction costs and promote 
specialization and cooperation between economic agents, does stand out. Even in developed coun-
tries saturated with reliable enforcement institutions, trust-based norms are often cheap and effec-
tive substitute for law and other formal arrangements. In the poor institutional environment of tran-
sition economies, where non-payment and deterioration of property rights become widespread, de-
veloping of trust-based norms can give rise to efficient property rights favorable for specialization 
and collective actions thereby facilitating economic growth in the country.  
Thus the major policy recommendation of the study is the encouragement of trust between manu-
facturers and distributors through promotion of networks. However, one should realize that inner 
networks could potentially limit business relations between producers and distributors only to net-
works comprised of friends and relatives, while outer networks broaden such opportunities to a 
wider number of independent distributors recommended by business associations and government 
agencies. We found that outer networks substantially lower the probability of vertical integration as 
well as the amount of required prepayment and level of contract completeness, thus reducing trans-
action costs and enhancing efficiency of market mechanisms. Therefore, the government policy 
must be focused on the outer networks through promotion of business associations and widening of 
government agencies' involvement in supporting establishment of relations between producers and 
distributors. This can reduce transaction cost, facilitate economic exchange and in the long run help 
economic growth. 
We presume that further research must employ cross-national study and should be focused on the 
understanding of mechanisms that generate extended trust and on the study of its contribution to 
lowering transaction costs and facilitating economic exchange between companies. This problem is 
very important, particularly in the context of development of transition economies. 
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APPENDICES  
A1. Tables 
Table 1. Regional Distribution of Sampled Enterprises 
City Frequency Percentage 
Tbilisi 201 66.7 
Rustavi 30 10.0 
Kutaisi 50 16.6 
Gori 20 6.7 
Total 301 100 
Table 2. Distribution of Sampled Enterprises by Industry 
 Kind of Economic Activity Frequency Percentage 
1 Manufacture of food products and beverages, and tobacco products 168 55.8 
2 Manufacture of tobacco  1 0.3 
3 Manufacture of textiles 2 0.7 
4 Manufacture of wearing apparel and dyeing of fur 11 3.7 
5 Manufacture of leather products and footwear 10 3.3 
6 Manufacture of wood and products of wood, except furniture 6 2.0 
7 Manufacture of furniture 19 6.3 
8 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 5 1.7 
9 Manufacture of machinery and equipment  10 3.3 
10 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 7 2.3 
11 Publishing and printing 23 7.6 
12 Manufacture of fabricated metals, excluding machinery and equipment 3 1.0 
13 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 8 2.7 
14 Other manufacturing 28 9.3 
 Total 301 100.0 
Table 3. Distribution of Sampled Enterprises by size (number of personnel, except sales staff) 
 Type of enterprise Frequency Percentage 
1 Small enterprises (under 50 employees) 248 83.5 
2 Medium enterprises (51–200 employees) 38 12.8 
3 Large enterprises (over 200 employees) 11 3.7 
 Total (four cases are system missing) 297 100 
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Table 4. KMO and Bartlett's Test (Asset specificity) 
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy  0.787 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 371.864 
 Degrees of freedom 6 
 Significance 0.001 
Table 5. Communalities (Asset specificity) 
 Initial Extraction 
Nature of the company 1.000 0.653 
Confidentiality of information 1.000 0.622 
Nature of the customer 1.000 0.708 
Customer loyalty 1.000 0.540 
Table 6. Total Variance Explained (Asset specificity) 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component 
Total Percentage  of Variance 
Cumulative 
Percentage Total 
Percentage  
of Variance 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 2.523 63.068 63.068 2.523 63.068 63.068 
2 0.586 14.646 77.714    
3 0.513 12.825 90.539    
4 0.378 9.461 100.000    
Table 7. Component Matrix (Asset specificity) 
 Component 1 
Nature of the company 0.808 
Confidentiality of information 0.789 
Nature of the customer 0.841 
Customer loyalty –0.735 
Table 8. Communalities for Validation Analysis (Asset specificity) 
Sample 1 Sample 2  
Initial Extraction Initial Extraction 
Nature of the company 1.000 0.626 1.000 0.678 
Confidentiality of information 1.000 0.572 1.000 0.667 
Nature of the customer 1.000 0.710 1.000 0.710 
Customer loyalty 1.000 0.505 1.000 0.568 
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Table 9. Component Matrix for Validation Analysis (Asset specificity) 
Sample 1 Sample 2  
Component 1 Component 1 
Nature of the company 0.792 0.823 
Confidentiality of information 0.756 0.817 
Nature of the customer 0.843 0.843 
Customer loyalty –0.711 –0.754 
Table 10. Reliability Analysis (Asset specificity) 
 Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item – 
Total Correlation 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted  
Nature of the company 13.8837 24.8964 0.6351 0.7465 
Confidentiality of 
information 
13.4120 25.4897 0.6105 0.7586 
Nature of the customer 14.2259 24.9488 0.6844 0.7225 
Customer loyalty 
(reversed) 12.9568 27.8348 0.5471 0.7873 
Chronbach's Alpha  0.8040 
Table 11. Correlation matrix for network trust variables 
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Pearson Correlation 1.000 0.755** 0.288** 0.153** 0.009 0.045 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 0.000 0.008 0.874 0.436 
Fa
m
ily
 
N 301 300 300 300 301 300 
Pearson Correlation 0.755** 1.000 0.449** 0.166** 0.087 0.053 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000  0.000 0.004 0.132 0.357 
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nd
s 
N 300 300 299 299 300 299 
Pearson Correlation 0.288** 0.449** 1.000 0.369** 0.232** 0.198** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.001 
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N 300 299 300 300 300 299 
Pearson Correlation 0.153** 0.166** 0.369** 1.000 0.453** 0.464** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008 0.004 0.000  0.000 0.000 
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Pearson Correlation 0.009 0.087 0.232** 0.453** 1.000 0.816** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.874 0.132 0.000 0.000  0.000 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 
N 301 300 300 300 301 300 
Pearson Correlation 0.045 0.053 0.198** 0.464** 0.816** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.436 0.357 0.001 0.000 0.000  
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N 300 299 299 299 300 300 
** — Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 12. KMO and Bartlett's Test (Network trust 1-st Iteration) 
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy  0.610 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 783.401 
 Degrees of freedom 15 
 Significance 0.000 
Table 13. Communalities (Network trust first Iteration) 
 Initial Extraction 
Family 1.000 0.786 
Friends 1.000 0.854 
Former colleagues 1.000 0.481 
Current distributors 1.000 0.547 
Government agencies 1.000 0.819 
Business associations 1.000 0.827 
Table 14. Communalities (Network trust second Iteration) 
 Initial Extraction 
Family 1.000 0.885 
Friends 1.000 0.879 
Current distributors 1.000 0.833 
Government agencies 1.000 0.840 
Business associations 1.000 0.840 
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Table 15. Total Variance Explained (Network trust second Iteration) 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component 
Total Percentage  of Variance 
Cumulative 
Percentage Total 
Percentage  
of Variance 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 2.291 45.810 45.810 2.291 45.810 45.810 
2 1.715 34.296 80.107 1.715 34.296 80.107 
3 0.584 11.672 91.779    
4 0.233 4.655 96.434    
5 0.178 3.566 100.000    
Table 16. Rotated Component Matrix (Network trust second Iteration) 
 Component 1 Component 2 
Family 4.676×10–2 0.940 
Friends 5.985×10–2 0.936 
Current distributors 0.725 0.188 
Government agencies 0.916 –2.073×10–2 
Business associations 0.916 –1.997×10–2 
Table 17. Communalities for Validation Analysis (Network trust second Iteration) 
Sample 1 Sample 2  
Initial Extraction Initial Extraction 
Family 1.000 0.878 1.000 0.893 
Friends 1.000 0.865 1.000 0.892 
Current distributors 1.000 0.537 1.000 0.583 
Government agencies 1.000 0.853 1.000 0.832 
Business associations 1.000 0.818 1.000 0.865 
Table 18. Component Matrix for Validation Analysis (Network trust second Iteration) 
Sample 1 Sample 2  
Component 1 Component 2 Component 1 Component 2 
Family 5.101×10–2 0.935 4.020×10–2 0.944 
Friends 0.107 0.924 2.193×10–2 0.944 
Current distributors 0.700 0.217 0.745 0.166 
Government agencies 0.923 3.863×10–2 0.909 –7.327×10–2 
Business associations 0.904 –2.778×10–2 0.930 –1.388×10–2 
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Table 19. Reliability Analysis (Network trust second Iteration) 
 Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance  
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item – 
Total Correlation 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted  
First component 
Current distributors 7.7759  4.0872  0.5068 0.8974 
Government agencies 7.3244  3.5219 0.7507 0.6513 
Business associations 7.3278 3.4157 0.7483 0.6502 
Chronbach's Alpha  0.8120 
Second component 
Family 2.9733 1.2568 0.7553 . 
Friends 2.9633 1.4201 0.7553 . 
Chronbach's Alpha 0.8597 
Table 20. Logit Model Results. Dependent variable: Choice of Governance Mode 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Parameter Estimates 
Intercept 7.662 9.264 8.008 
TCE variables 
AS Asset Specificity 1.1785*** 1.2089*** 1.1315*** 
U Uncertainty 0.5664*** 0. 6243*** 0.6065*** 
S Size  –0.5039*** –0.4962*** –0.4070** 
Trust Variables 
G_T General Trust 0.0348 0.0046 0.0144 
CC Confidence in courts  0.0492 0.0852 0.0372 
IN Inner Networks –1.4129*** –1.3625*** –1. 2405*** 
ON Outer Networks –1.2842*** – – 
GA Government agencies – –0.9755*** – 
BA Business associations – – –0.6611*** 
Control Variables 
Ind1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 
1.8966** 1.7267** 1.7054** 
Ind2 Manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel 10.1624 10.0078 8.5486 
Ind3 Manufacture of leather products and footwear 0.1281 0.2382 0.2452 
Ind4 Manufacture of wood products 9.2827 8.9317 7.8954 
Ind5 Manufacture of furniture 1.8892 1.8708 1.3086 
Ind6 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 9.4702 10.1168 8.7722 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ind7 Manufacture of machinery, equipment and fabricated metals –1.8711 –1.7043 –1.5078 
Ind8 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products –1.2470 –1.3949 –1.5548 
Ind9 Publishing and printing –0.8726 –1.0923 –1.2314 
Ind10 Manufacture of chemicals 1.9465 1.6255 1.5535 
O_R (1) Originally private firm –8.0155 –7.8182 –7.3699 
O_R (2) Privatized state-owned enterprises –7.1521 –7.1007 –6.7557 
O_R (3) State-owned enterprise –7.3327 –7.4172 –6.4784 
Goodness-of-Fit 
–2 Log Likelihood  117.354 124.768 134.492 
Goodness-of-Fit 444.429 371.151 533.951 
Cox & Snell — R2 0.458 0.442 0.420 
Nagelkerke — R2  0.695 0.671 0.638 
 Chi-square; df; (sign) 
Model 155.56; 20 
(0.000) 
148.18; 20 
(0.000) 
138.44; 20
0(.000) 
Block 155.56; 20 
(0.000) 
148.18; 20 
(0.000) 
138.44; 20
(0.000) 
Step 155.56; 20 
(0.000) 
148.18; 20 
(0.000) 
138.44; 20
(0.000) 
Overall Percentage of Correct Predictions 90.16% 90.55% 90.16% 
Sample Size 
Total number of cases 301 301 301 
Number of cases included in the analysis 254 254 254 
*** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 level. 
Table 21. Results of the first stage of estimation for 2SCML Probit model (OLS Reduced form coefficients for endoge-
nous variables). Dependent variables  
 Confidence in courts (CC) 
Inner Networks 
(IN) 
Outer 
Networks 
(ON) 
Intercept 1.398 –2.192*** 0.158 
Independent variables 
AS Asset Specificity –0.029 0.386 –0.147** 
U Uncertainty –0.065  0.016 –0.102*** 
S Size 0.066  –0.061 –0.001 
G_T General Trust –0.053  0.012 –0.064 
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 Confidence in courts (CC) 
Inner Networks 
(IN) 
Outer 
Networks 
(ON) 
Control Variables 
Ind1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and 
tobacco products –0.468 0.091 0.431** 
Ind2 Manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel –0.090  0.305 0.694** 
Ind3 Manufacture of leather products and footwear –0.817 –0.639 –0.015  
Ind4 Manufacture of wood products 0.876 0.624 1.372*** 
Ind5 Manufacture of furniture –0.355 0.123 0.027 
Ind6 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products –2.335** –0.442 –1.044* 
Ind7 Manufacture of machinery, equipment and 
fabricated metals –0.842  0.327 0.253 
Ind8 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products –1.284 –0.009 0.385 
Ind9 Publishing and printing –0.468 0.217 0.486* 
Ind10 Manufacture of chemicals –0.256 0.183 –0.011 
O_R_1 New private firms 0.979 0.401 –0.879 
O_R_2 Privatized firms 0.575 0.529 –0.761 
O_R_3 State-owned enterprises 6.376*** 0.133 0.052 
Instrument variables (Excluded from structural equations) 
CCE Confidence in courts at earlier point in time 0.868*** 0.020 0.024 
PСIN Possibility for manufacturer to create an inner 
network –0.196*** 0.435*** –0.001 
PСON Possibility for manufacturer to create an outer 
network 0.068 –0.043 –0.329*** 
R2 0.613 0.620 0.519 
Adjusted R2 0.559 0.569 0.452 
F-statistic  
(p-values in the brackets) 
11.25 
(0.000) 
11.71 
(0.000) 
7.72 
(0.000) 
F-statistic for excluded variables  
(p-values in the brackets) 
62.99 
(0.000) 
67.97 
(0.000) 
28.84 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 163 164 164 
*** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 level. 
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Table 22. Results of the second stage of estimation for 2SCML Probit model (Probit analysis)  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 4.730*** 5.629*** 
Independent variables 
AS Asset Specificity 0.784*** 0.606*** 
U Uncertainty 0.391*** 0.285*** 
S Size –0.386*** –0.281*** 
ON Outer Networks –1.010*** –0.706*** 
IN Inner Networks –0.930*** –0.720*** 
CC Confidence in courts  –0.071  0.019 
G_T General Trust 0.105 0.012 
Control Variables 
Ind1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 0.583  0.834** 
Ind2 Manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel 7.089 7.515 
Ind3 Manufacture of leather products and footwear 3.983 –0.079 
Ind4 Manufacture of wood products 4.939 6.037 
Ind5 Manufacture of furniture –0.577 0.889 
Ind6 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 5.796 6.107 
Ind7 Manufacture of machinery, equipment and fabricated 
metals –1.576 –1.066 
Ind8 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products –1.396 –0.802  
Ind9 Publishing and printing –1.662** –0.611 
Ind10 Manufacture of chemicals –0.546 0.890 
O_R_1 New private firms –4.551*** –5.523*** 
O_R_2 Privatized firms –4.342 –5.016 
O_R_3 State-owned enterprises 1.063  –5.127 
Endogeneity control 
RES_CC Confidence in courts residual 0.115 – 
RES_IN Inner network residual 0.545 – 
RES_ON Outer network residual 0.433 – 
Pseudo R2 0.608 0.561 
LR Chi-Sq. 
(degrees of freedom) 
108.79 
(23) 
153.19 
(20) 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Input records 194 301 
Records kept for analysis 162 254 
Cases excluded due to missing data 32 47 
*** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 level. 
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Table 23. Descriptive statistics for amount of prepayment 
Amount of prepayment Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage 
0 62 62 62 
4 1 1 63 
5 1 1 64 
10 2 2 66 
15 1 1 67 
20 3 3 70 
30 2 2 72 
40 3 3 75 
50 10 10 85 
60 1 1 86 
70 1 1 87 
75 1 1 88 
80 1 1 89 
100 11 11 100 
Total 100 100 – 
Table 24. Descriptive statistics for the term of contract in months 
Term of contract in months Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage 
No Contract 18 17.8 17.8 
6 3 3 20.8 
11 1 1 21.8 
12 69 68.3 90.1 
24 5 4.9 95 
36 1 1 96 
48 2 2 98 
60 1 1 99 
Term less  1 1 100 
Total 101 100 - 
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Table 25. Descriptive statistics for length of contract in numbers of pages 
Length of contract in numbers of pages Frequency Percentage  Cumulative percentage 
No Contract 18 17.8 17.8 
1 26 25.7 43.5 
2 32 31.7 75.2 
3 12 11.8 87 
4 3 3 90 
5 5 5 95 
7 2 2 97 
8 1 1 98 
10  1 1 99 
12 1 1 100 
Total 101 100 - 
Table 26. SUR and Tobit Results 
 SUR 1 SUR 2 SUR 3 Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3 
Dependent variable: Prepayment (PP) 
AS Asset Specificity 4.203 4.354 3.336 10.279 10.741 7.718 
U Uncertainty 4.517** 4.461** 4.873** 10.101** 10.032** 10.377** 
G_T General Trust –0.216 –0.205 –0.590 1.206 1.322 0.448 
CC Confidence in courts  –1.982 –2.064 –1.633 –5.116 –5.412 –4.282 
IN Inner Networks –9.830*** –10.596*** –9.482*** –18.039*** –20.419*** –17.330*** 
ON Outer Networks –12.025*** – – –19.632*** – – 
GA Government agencies – –11.158*** – – –20.239*** – 
BA Business associations – – –12.729*** – – –21.976*** 
HBR History of business 
relation 1.192 1.130 0.852 3.583 3.729 3.219 
MP Market Power 11.451 10.958 13.642* 24.082 24.101 27.490* 
Aux Auxiliary function –14.431* –12.993 –10.756 –30.359* –29.385* –23.281 
 Intercept 17.312 40.374** 38.918** –33.805 7.925 4.558 
 RMSE 29.243 29.2416 28.4577 – – – 
 R2 0.3456 0.3457 0.3803 – – – 
 Pseudo R2 – – – 0.069 0.072 0.076 
 Chi-sq. 
(p-value) 
42.7845 
(0.0000) 
42. 7986 
(0.0000) 
49.7124 
(0.0000) 
– – – 
 LR Chi-sq. 
(p-value) 
– – – 32.66 
(0.0002) 
34.34 
(0.0001) 
36.25 
(0.0000) 
 Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 
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 SUR 1 SUR 2 SUR 3 Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3 
Dependent variable: Completeness (COMPL) 
AS Asset Specificity –0.142 –0.121 –0.126 –0.118 –0.097 –0.100 
U Uncertainty 0.136 0.134 0.169 0.203 0.198 0.237 
G_T General Trust –0.110 –0.109 –0.132 –0.156 –0.154 –0.178 
CC Confidence in courts  0.058 0.051 0.067 0.122 0.112 0.123 
IN Inner Networks –0.377* –0.426** –0.321 –0.425* –0.497* –0.368 
ON Outer Networks –0.901*** – – –1.052*** – – 
GA Government agencies – 0.804 *** – – –0.944*** – 
BA Business associations – – –0.699*** – – –0.826*** 
HBR History of business 
relation 
–0.030 –0.035 –0.051 0.018 0.011 –0.007 
MP Market Power –0.707 –0.739 –0.563 –0.653 –0.657 –0.489 
Aux Auxiliary function –0.894* –0.785 –0.653 –1.172* –1.072 –0.862 
 Intercept 3.823*** 5.459*** 4.834*** 3.238** 5.137*** 4.487*** 
 RMSE 1.9125 1.9260 1.9591 – – – 
 R2 0.2179 0.2068 0.1793 – – – 
 Pseudo R2 – – – 0.057 0.054 0.048 
 Chi-sq. 
(p-value) 
22.5682 
(0.0072) 
21.221 
(0.0121) 
17.6982 
(0.0388) 
– – – 
 LR Chi-sq. 
(p-value) 
– – – 19.96 
(0.0182) 
18.95 
(0.0256) 
16.77 
(0.0524) 
 Observations 81 81 81 83 83 83 
*** — significant at p < 0.01 level; ** — significant at p < 0.05 level; * — significant at p < 0.1 level. 
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Fig. 1. Regional Distribution of Firms 
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Fig. 2. Distribution of Firms by Industry 
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Fig. 3. Distribution of Firms by Size 
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Fig. 5. Forms of Distribution Organization 
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Figure 6. Switching Patterns of Distribution Organization Form (Situation 3 years ago) 
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Fig. 7. Types of Control Mechanisms Used by Manufacturers 
A3. Questionnaire 
(Please answer the following questions as to your firm's largest distributor in terms of sales in 2005) 
1. Dependent variables 
1.1. Please indicate how your company arranges its distribution function (check one of the alterna-
tives)6: 
 Through its own sales personnel 
 Through Its own sales company 
 Through exclusive dealers 
 Through franchise  
 Through independent distributors 
1.2. If your company arranges distribution through independent distributors, please answer the fol-
lowing questions:  
1.2.1. Please indicate the amount of prepayment (in percentage terms) that your company requires 
from its distributors. 
1.2.2. How many pages does a formal contract that governs your firm's relationships with your cus-
tomers have? 
2. Independent variables 
2.1. Asset Specificity Measures (AS) 
The statements below describe the asset specificity of transaction. Please indicate the extent to 
which the following statement describes your perception: 
                                                 
6 Only the first two options refer to a hierarchical governance mode. 
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2.1.1. It is difficult to learn all the ins and outs of our company that a salesperson needs to know to 
be effective.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.1.2. An experienced salesperson's inside information could do us a lot of damage if it got out. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.1.3. To be effective, a salesperson has to take a lot of time to get to know our accounts. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.1.4. Personal relationships between our salespeople and accounts have little influence on sales of 
our product line7.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.2. Uncertainty Measure (U) 
The statement below describes uncertainty caused by the difficulty of measuring the results of indi-
vidual salesperson equitably.  
"It is very difficult to measure equitably the results of individual salesperson". 
Please indicate the extent to which the statement describes your perception: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.3. Company Size (S) 
Please indicate your company's staff size in 2005 (Excluding sales department staff).  
                                                 
7 Greater loyalty is measured as disagreement with the statement 
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2.4. Network trust (NT)8 
How important are the following as potential sources of information about new distributors of your 
firm: 
Sources of information Extremely important 
Very 
important 
Fairly 
important 
Not very 
important 
Not 
important 
Do not 
know 
2.5.1. Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.5.2. Friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.5.3. Prior employment 
of potential distributor 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.5.4. Existing 
distributors 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.5.5. Government 
agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.5.6. Business 
associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.5. General Trust (GT)  
Please indicate the extent to which the following statement describes your perception: "Most of the 
people can be trusted"9. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.6. Confidence in court (CC) 
Please indicate the extent to which the following statement describes your perception: "I am confi-
dent that the legal system will uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes." 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Instrumental variables 
3.1. Confidence in courts at earlier point in time (CCE) 
To what degree would you have agreed with the previous statement 3 years ago?  
                                                 
8 Don’t know items in this and all other questions are treated as missing values in further analysis. 
9 Adapted from World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)  
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Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.2. Possibility for manufacturer to create an inner network (PCIN)10 
By the moment of making decision on the organization of distribution function at our company, we 
had a possibility to organize this function through companies owned by our relatives or friends.  
Please indicate the extent to which the above statement describes your perception: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.3. Possibility for manufacturer to create an outer network (PCON)  
By the moment of making decision on the organization of distribution function at our company, we 
had a possibility to organize this function through companies recommended by business associa-
tions and governmental agencies.  
Please indicate your extent of agreement about how well the statement describes your perception: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Control variables 
4.1. Auxiliary function (Aux) 
Is outsource form of distribution used by your company the main form of distribution? 
Yes No 
4.2. Market power (MP). 
How many alternative sources of supplying are available to your distributor? 
4.3. Origin of the firm (OR). 
How was your firm established11? 
                                                 
10 Questions 3.2 and 3.3 were asked in about six months after the main survey had been conducted. 
11 This as well as the following two questions are adapted from World Business Environment Survey 
(www.worldbank.org) 
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Originally private, from the start up (no state-owned predecessor in the Soviet period) 
Yes No 
Privatization of state-owned firm  
Yes No 
State-owned enterprise 
Yes No 
Private subsidiary of state-owned enterprise 
Yes No 
4.4. History of business relationship (HBR) 
How long has your company sold products in this product line to this distributor? 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5–10 years 11–20 years over 20 years 
4.5. Industry type (In) 
How would you best describe your company's industry type? 
Manufacture of food products and beverages 1 
Manufacture of tobacco products 2 
Manufacture of textiles 3 
Manufacture of wearing apparel 4 
Manufacture of leather products and footwear 5 
Manufacture of wood and wood products 6 
Manufacture of furniture 7 
Manufacture of paper products 8 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 9 
Other 10 
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